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Abstract
The last few years have witnessed a rapid growth in commoditization and consumption of IT services
particularly due to the growing acceptance of cloud computing services. This in turn has led to newer
forms of pricing the cloud services such as dynamic pricing. Infact, spot pricing, a dynamic pricing
scheme has become mainstream. Cloud consumers using these schemes need to place their bids inorder
to procure computing instances. Most of extant research on cloud dynamic pricing focuses on resource
allocation problems and bidding strategies. We identify the need to look at behavioural biases of
bidders to bring in a holistic perspective to cloud dynamic pricing discussions. In this paper, we
conduct an experiment to elicit the impact of a behavioural bias namely, loss aversion, on a cloud
consumer’s bidding behaviour. We discuss the social implications of our result to cloud consumers and
the economic implications for cloud providers.

Keywords: Cloud Computing, Dynamic pricing, Loss Aversion, Bidder Behaviour

1.0 Introduction
Cloud Computing is a new paradigm that comprises shifting Information Technology
(IT) resources and software from locally independent computers to a more
collaborative level (Hayes, 2008). This growing supply and adoption of cloud, which
is perceived as the fifth utility has triggered the commoditization of IT. These services
have transformed the way IT delivery happens in an organization. Consumers are
aggressively pursuing this shift and Forrester predicts that the cloud computing
market will cross $241 billion by the year 2020. Over the years, we find cloud
adoption to be on the rise and research indicates that the emerging network of cloud
players is expanding (Weinman, 2011). This is primarily because of the flexibility that
cloud offers to organizations to meet variable demand without any fixed investment in
capacity. This flexibility combined with the cost advantage has led to the growth of
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cloud computing and today it not just attracts IT/IS users but also service providers,
who see a huge business opportunity in selling cloud services. As large and mid-size
cloud vendors try to capture greater market share, demand for robust and efficient
pricing models is sure to increase.
As the competitive pressures mount, it is imperative for service providers to
look at the cloud market from a user perspective, particularly in the case of dynamic
pricing market since the dynamic price is also a function of the user’s bid price. There
is an implicit assumption that users who are bidders in these markets are rational
(Mihailescu & Teo, 2010; Shneidman & Parkes, 2003). However in reality bidders
can behave irrationally due to the influence of various behavioural biases that they
may possess. For example, data from Amazon indicates that, at times, bids for
computing instance exceed the standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG) price. Such
irrationality could stem from the biases that a bidder may possess.
The behavioural biases inherent to users could have important implications for
IS decisions pertaining to cloud adoption and usage as well as in rendering cloud
services. Our research specifically focuses on analyzing pricing and bidding decisions
in the context of cloud computing in the presence of loss-averse users. In Section 2,
we provide the research gaps and motivation. In Section 3, we summarize the
background and related work. We discuss the dynamic pricing literature pertinent to
cloud computing and the behavioural economics literature on key biases that could
impact bidder behaviour with special emphasis on loss aversion. In Section 4, we
discuss the context for loss aversion in a dynamically priced cloud services market. In
section 5, we present the details and results of our experiment. Next we present the
implications namely the social implications for cloud users and the economic
implications for cloud providers.

2.0 Research Gaps and Motivation
A lot of research is currently taking place in the technical aspects of cloud and there is
an urgent need for understanding the business-related issues surrounding cloud
computing (Marston, et al., 2011). A search with 22 different keywords on 9 journal
databases returned 2891 unique papers. Of these papers, only 32 comprised of pricing
(Sowmya, et al., 2013) and none of these considered behavioural biases.
On the other hand, research on behavioural biases in the context of pricing decision
for the cloud cannot be waived of as irrelevant. A snapshot (see Figure 1) from
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Amazon’s spot price video serves as an evidence of irrational bidding. We can
observe from the chart that approximately 15% of the bidders quote a price much
higher than the on-demand price and almost 0% quote a price less than 30%.

Figure 1: Snapshot from Amazon EC2: Bid distribution as a percentage of OnDemand price.

For any viable business, economic models help in formulating the pricing and tariff
structures to optimize return on investment, create critical mass of customers and
manage resource deployment more efficiently. Current business models within cloud
computing business case have been mainly studied and simulated for defining
resource allocation algorithms rather than advocating and creating full-fledged
economic models. There are many unresolved issues such as, how to determine and
create tariff structures with a view to evolving a sustainable business over a long and
lasting period term? The assumptions in the current models need to be examined to
improve sustainability. The current models that assume rational users need to be
questioned and new pricing models need to be developed which account for the
irrationality of users. As a first step in this direction, we examine the effect of a
behavioural bias namely loss aversion on the bid prices in an online cloud computing
market.

3.0 Background & Related Work
3.1

Pricing in Cloud Computing Markets

Much before the advent of Cloud Computing, researchers have proposed online
markets for computational resources. One of the earliest works is the Popcorn Market
project by Regev and Nisan (2000). Since then researchers have formulated many
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economic models for sharing computing resources. In the case of Cloud service
providers, every provider has its own pricing scheme, for example, Salesforce uses
“pay per use” scheme (Weinhardt, et al., 2009), Amazon uses “pay-per-use fixed
pricing” (Amazon Simple Storage Service) and few others use “pay for the resources”
that are assessed based on speed of bandwidth or amount of storage. According to
Weinhardt et al. (2009), the most prevalent method of pricing in cloud is pay as you
go (also known as the on-demand model or PAYG), which is based on units with
constant price. Another common pricing model is subscription (also known as
reserved instance model), wherein users sign a contract (subscribe) based on constant
price of service unit for a longer period, say six months to a year. Obviously,
customers and providers would like to use static and simple pricing models in order to
ease payment prediction. Nevertheless, research indicates that dynamic pricing can be
more efficient (Anandasivam & Premm, 2009; Mihailescu & Teo, 2010).
3.1.1

Dynamic Pricing in Cloud Computing

Dynamic pricing involves dynamically adjusting the prices of a product or
service to customers, based on the value the customers attribute to that product or
service (Reinartz, 2001). There are several works that have studied dynamic pricing in
the context of cloud computing. Research shows that, users should bid optimally in a
dynamic pricing scheme to achieve different objectives with desired levels of
confidence in a cloud computing setup (Andrzejak, 2010). Few researchers have gone
a step further and examined dynamic price traces and built models around that. Javadi
et al (2011) have provided a statistical model of dynamic prices in a public cloud
environment. Dynamic pricing, in principle, encourages users to shift their flexible
workloads from provider's peak hours to off-peak hours and thus obtain monetary
incentives. An analysis of one year dynamic price data by Wee (2011) shows that it is
reasonable for users to shift their workloads from PAYG to dynamic price since it was
on an average 52.3% cheaper; however, shifting the workload to cheaper spot periods
provides only 3.7 % additional cost savings. Research in dynamic pricing has led to
the adoption of dynamic pricing schemes by cloud providers. Spot pricing is one such
dynamic pricing scheme introduced for computing resources in 2009 by Amazon Web
Services.
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Spot Pricing

Spot pricing enables users to bid for unused capacity, i.e. the capacity that remains
with the cloud provider after fulfilling the on-demand and reserved instance demands.
Instances are charged the Spot Price, which is set by the service provider and
fluctuates periodically depending on the supply of and demand for Spot Instance
capacity. Consider a bidder, whose has a certain valuation for executing a task on a
particular type of spot instance. In a spot pricing scheme, if the bid price exceeds the
current spot price, the instance is allocated until either the user chooses to terminate or
the vendor initiates the termination automatically if the spot price exceeds the bid
price.
The spot market is like a uniform price auction of multiple homogeneous goods where
each client bids for a single good which is the spot instance (Sowmya & Sundarraj,
2013). The provider chooses the top N bidders. The value of N varies based on the
supply (unused capacity at hand) and cannot exceed the available capacity. The
provider sets the uniform price to the lowest clearing bid. All winning bidders pay this
price for the cloud services.Though the above works have studied static and dynamic
pricing schemes in the context of cloud computing, none of them have considered
behavioural biases. In the following section, we survey the literature in the domain of
behavioural biases to contextualize our proposed research.
3.2

Loss Aversion and other Biases
Research on bidder behaviour started since the existence of auctions. One of

the interesting aspects is to look at the various biases that can impact bidder
behaviour. This section lists some of the common biases and particularly research
done in the context of online auctions.
3.2.1

Biases in Bidder Behaviour

Deck et al have shown through experimental evidence that, an individual’s
willingness to take financial risks significantly affects behaviour; the effect is
particularly greater when the task is framed as a financial decision (Deck, et al.,
2010). For example, when a bidder is posed the question “If you do not want to lose
XYZ you will have to raise your bids to $500”, the bidder is likely to increase the bid
value (Ku, 2000). This bias in behaviour is commonly referred to as framing effect.
According to Bramsen and Martin (2009), bidders may feel a quasi-endowment effect
towards the object for which they are bidding. Bidders can get a feeling of ownership
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of the auctioned item during an auction and behave as if they are real owners.
Behavioural economists Ariely and Simonson (2003) claim that, a low starting price
can draw more bidders and these bidders bid relatively low because of anchoring
effect of the starting bid (reference price). In a recent study, Kuruzovich (2012)
indicates that mental accounting can increase bidder valuation over time. Dholakia
and Soltysinski (2001), provide evidence of herd behaviour bias: in online auctions,
bidders would herd behind other bidders even when choices did not reveal private
information. In this paper, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on bidder
behaviour. Section 2.3 provides details on loss aversion.
3.2.2

Loss Aversion

The irrational behaviour of bidders could stem from loss aversion - the
behavioural tendency of individuals to perceive losses as more substantial when
compared with gains of the same objective magnitude. When making decisions,
people directly compare potential losses and gains and often give more weight to the
losses (Benartzi, 1995; Kliger & Levit, 2009; McGraw, et al., 2010). This larger
weight given to negative outcomes is attributed to loss aversion, i.e., “losses loom
larger than gains” (Liberman, et al., 2005; Kahneman, et al., 1991). Kahneman &
Tversky (1979) suggested that loss aversion be defined by −U(−x) > U(x) for all x >
0. We can capture loss aversion using the following utility function:
( )
( )

{

( )

where λ >1 is the loss aversion coefficient, commonly known as the loss aversion
index. Loss aversion has been used to explain many effects observed in the context of
decision-making. In the context of online bidding, Dittrich et al (2008) claim that an
actual loss will change bidding dispositions more than an equally large gain due to
loss-averse behaviour.
Measuring loss aversion could have important implications for system designers.
Researchers have established and observed qualitative support for loss aversion. Few
studies have also performed quantitative estimations of loss aversions. Since loss
aversion is a function of the utility for gains and utility for losses, to measure loss
aversion both must be measured simultaneously. Research has indicated that until
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recently, no clear method existed to measure loss aversion unless additional
assumptions were imposed (Abdellaoui, et al., 2008).

4.0 Loss aversion in the context of bidding for Cloud services
Spot Instances enable users to bid for unused capacity. Instances are charged the Spot
Price, which is set by the service provider and fluctuates periodically depending on
the supply of and demand for Spot Instance capacity. Consider a bidder, say X, whose
valuation for executing a task on a particular spot instance is $1. In a spot pricing
scheme, if the bid price exceeds the current spot price, the instance is allocated until
either the user chooses to terminate upon task completion or the vendor initiates
termination upon the spot price increasing above the bid price. In this case, from the
spot price history data we list the following scenario:
Choice A: 99% chance of getting terminated before task completion if bid price = $1
Choice B: 50% chance of getting terminated before task completion if bid price = $2
Clearly X has to decide between the choices A and B. In both the cases, the spot may
be allocated to the user if the bid price is higher than the current spot price and bidder
X continues to hold the computing instance until the dynamically generated spot price
goes above bidder X’s original bid price. If the new spot price is above bidder X’s bid
price, it can result in X’s current computing instance allocation to be abruptly
withdrawn. Research has indicated that most bidders might choose option B inorder to
avoid losing their current spot allocation. This behaviour can be attributed to loss
aversion (Kahneman, et al., 1990). In this paper, we intend to test the loss behaviour
of bidders and its impact on bid decision. We test our hypothesis using a lab
experiment discussed in Section 5.
4.1

Hypothesis

To validate the scenario discussed above, we raise the following hypothesis. Let APAYG indicate a bid price above the on-demand/ pay as you go price and B-PAYG
indicate a bid price below the on-demand/ pay as you go price.

H1: The Loss aversion index for bidders who bid A-PAYG price is higher than the
Loss aversion index of bidders who bid B-PAYG price.
Here For the purpose of testing the hypothesis, we collect user’s bids through a
bidding experiment and measure the loss aversion of the participants.
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5.0 Experiment
To elicit the impact of loss aversion on a cloud consumer’s bidding behaviour we
conduct a lab experiment to measure the WTA-WTP gap. The details and results of
the experiment are discussed in the following sub-sections.
5.1

Design

In this experiment, we elicited the valuations of the participants using a market
environment, wherein the subjects had to bid for computing instances that were
limited in supply. We did not do perform practice rounds to avoid possible effects of
learning. However, we ran two pilot rounds to ensure the flow and the sequence of the
experiment are smooth. Based on the feedback received from the participants of the
pilot experiment we revised the experiment, particularly the instructions and the postexperiment questionnaire.
5.2

Participants

Figure 2: Participant Demographics

One hundred and eighty two students with Graduate and Undergraduate background
participated in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and individual.
Participants did not receive any payment for participation. We gave oral instructions
to all participants. In addition, we also provided the instructions in print form and on
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the bidding screen. The profile of participants in shown in Figure 2 and gives the
grouping based on age, gender, work experience and participant’s experience with
game theory. We can observe from Figure 2 that most participants where between the
age groups 21-30 and had no or very less work experience.
5.3

Procedure

The experimental conditions involved each of the participants placing bids for cloud
spot instance once. A short briefing on how the Cloud spot market works was given.
In addition, we gave instructions on paper along with spot price history data. Then, we
asked to participants to place their bids on a virtual spot market designed for this
experiment. We computed the results of the bidding and published it to the
participants at the end of the bidding round. The next step involved calculating the
loss aversion index.
5.3.1

Eliciting Loss Aversion using WTA-WTP method

The willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) method of eliciting
loss aversion was established since 1980’s. One of the earliest works involving an
experiment to test the WTA-WTP gap was by Knetsch and Sinden (1984). Coursey et
al (1987) through their experiments established the large disparity between WTA and
WTP. Kahneman et al (1990) report several experiments where the measures of WTA
exceeds measures of WTP. The gap between WTA and WTP has been interpreted as
evidence for loss aversion in riskless choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Since then
several researchers have used WTA-WTP gap to measure loss aversion. Gachter et al
(2010) measure individual-level loss aversion in riskless choices in an endowment
effect experiment by eliciting both WTA and WTP from about 360 subjects. List of
other works could be found in the reviews of Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and
Sayman and Öncüler (2005).
We adopt the WTA-WTP gap procedure to calculate the loss aversion index. The bids
placed by the participants indicated their WTP. To elicit the WTA, the participants
were given a post-experiment questionnaire. Here, they were asked to assume
themselves as a cloud vendor and give a price at which they will be willing to accept
to provide a cloud service. The participants were given instructions to assume the
cloud service to be similar to the one they had bid for in the previous round. Using
these two values, i.e., the WTA and WTP, we calculate the loss aversion index for
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each participant which is a ratio of the corresponding WTA and WTP for that
participant.
5.4

Results

Group

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

A-PAYG

49

2.1833

1.45134

.20733

B-PAYG

133

1.7268

1.08833

.09437

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Table 1 gives the summary statistics. We observed that about one-third of the
subjects belong to the A-PAYG group. We use the Levene Test for testing equality of
variance (see Table 2). It tests the null hypothesis that the population variances are
equal. Since the resulting p-value of Levene's test is greater than the critical value of
0.05. A value greater than .05 means that the variability in the two conditions is about
the same and is not significantly different. Next, we perform the t-test for equality of
means. The results are summarized in Table 3. The results indicate that the loss
aversion index for above PAYG bidders vs below PAYG bidders is statistically
different. The average Loss aversion index is higher for above-PAYG bidders (2.18)
than the below-PAYG bidders (1.72).

Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances

LAI

F

Sig.

3.029

.084

Table 2: Test for Equality of Variance

t

df

Sig.

Mean
Difference

2.284

180

.024

.45642

Table 3: T-test for equality of means

Std. Error
Difference
.19986
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6.0 Implications
6.1

Social implications for Cloud Consumers

As can be observed from the results of the experiment, loss-averse users tend to bid
higher. This could have a ripple effect on other bidders in the system. Although, one
could view the cloud spot market as an economic setup it is also a social aggregate.
The actions of a bidder(s) in the system could have an impact on the other bidders in
the system since all these individual bidders comprise a social aggregate. The spot
price is a function of supply and demand (see section 3.1.2). Loss averse users, who
perceive “not winning a computing instance” as a loss, would start bidding higher and
this in turn could lead to an increase in the overall spot price. Presence of such loss
averse users could be disadvantageous to the other users in the system as they also
face the increased spot price. This type of behaviour in a system comprising a social
aggregate could be due to the collective action problem. Thomas Schelling talks about
the Collective action problem, in his famous book “Micromotives and
Macrobehaviour”, where he explores the relation between the behavioural
characteristics of the individuals who comprise some social aggregate (Schelling,
1978). Hence, the behavioural irregularities exhibited by certain users in a system
could have an impact on the other users in those systems.
Agents interested in addressing the above social situation could look at alternatives to
overcome loss aversion. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)

propose the power of

aggregation method to overcome loss aversion. An application of this method can be
found in Milkman et al (2012) where they propose policy bundling to overcome loss
aversion as a method to improve legislative outcomes.

6.2

Economic implications for Cloud Providers

Psychological factors and behavioural regularities may have important implications
on operational problems such as pricing (Su, 2009) . In an environment that comprises
of bidders with various behavioural biases, the service provider can benefit by using a
price update algorithm that computes the spot prices in a way that exploits the
behavioural biases of the bidders. For example, by learning the ratio of users with a
certain type of bias such as loss aversion, in the system, the service provider can alter
the spot price to accommodate the irrational behaviour of this proportion of bidders
and thereby increase provider’s revenues.
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7.0 Conclusion
Although large WTA-WTP ratios are well documented and also evidenced in our
experiment, the findings do not seem to have had much effect on either economic
models or discussions of pricing design for online computing resources. Current
dynamic pricing schemes for the cloud are based on demand and supply only. As part
of future work, we intend to develop dynamic pricing schemes which are based on
factors that capture the behavioural biases of the users. Bidders could also possess
other behavioural biases. In this paper, we consider loss aversion, however other
biases such as anchoring (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), mental accounting (Thaler,
1985), herding (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) need to be studied in the context of our
current problem statement. Furthermore, the bid pricing and the dynamic pricing
algorithms can be optimized by learning algorithms developed to detect and adapt
based on the consumer’s biases.

References
Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H., & l’Haridon, O. (2008). A tractable method to
measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 36(3), 245-266.
Agmon Ben-Yehuda, O., Ben-Yehuda, M., Schuster, A., & Tsafrir, D. (2011).
Deconstructing Amazon EC2 spot instance pricing. IEEE Third International
Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), 304311.
Amazon Simple Storage Service . Retrieved July 13, 2013, from Amazon S3:
http://aws.amazon.com/s3/
Anandasivam, A., & Premm, M. (2009). Bid price control and dynamic pricing in
clouds. Proceedings of the European Conference on Information Systems, (pp.
1--14).
Andrzejak, A., Kondo, D., & Yi, S. (2010). Decision model for cloud computing
under SLA constraints. Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on
Modelling, Analysis & Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication
Systems (MASCOTS), (pp. 257--266).
Ariely, D., & Simonson, I. (2003). Buying, bidding, playing, or competing? Value
assessment and decision dynamics in online auctions. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 13(1), 113--123.
Benartzi, S. a. (1995). Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. The
quarterly journal of Economics, 110(1), 73-92.
Bramsen, J. (2009). A pseudo-endowment effect in internet auctions. Munich Personal
RePEc Archive Working Paper .

Online Bidding Behaviour and Loss Aversion in Cloud Computing Markets:
An Experiment

Coursey, D. L., Hovis, J. L., & Schulze., W. D. (1987). The disparity between
willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics , 679-690.
Deck, C. A., Lee, J., & Reyes, J. A. (2010). Personality and the Consistency of Risk
Taking Behaviour: Experimental Evidence. Chapman University, Economic
Science Institute.
Dholakia, U. M., & Soltysinski, K. (2001). Coveted or Overlooked? The Psychology
of Bidding for Comparable Listings in Digital Auctions. Marketing Letters, 12,
225-237.
Dittrich, D., W.Güth, Kocher, M., & Pezanis-Christou, P. (2008). Loss aversion and
learning to bid. Economica, 79(314), 226-257.
Gächter, S., Johnson, E. J., & Herrmann., A. (2010). Individual-level loss aversion in
riskless and risky choices. CeDEx discussion paper series.
Hayes, B. (2008). Cloud computing. Communications of the ACM, 51(7), 9-11.
Horowitz, J. K., & McConnell., K. E. (2002). A review of WTA/WTP studies. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 426-447.
Javadi, B., Thulasiram, R., & Buyya, R. (2011). Statistical Modeling of Spot Instance
Prices in Public Cloud Environments. Proceedings of Fourth IEEE
International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing (UCC), (pp. 219-228).
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993). Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive
perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39(1), 17-31.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica, 263-291.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler., R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the
endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of political Economy, 13251348.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1991). Anomalies: The endowment effect,
loss aversion, and status quo bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1),
193--206.
Kliger, D., & Levit, B. (2009). Evaluation periods and asset prices: Myopic loss
aversion at the financial marketplace. Journal of Economic Behaviour &
Organization , 71(2), 361-371.
Knetsch, J. L., & Sinden., J. A. (1984). Willingness to pay and compensation
demanded: Experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of
value. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 507-521.
Ku, G. (2000). Auctions and auction fever: Explanations from competitive arousal
and framing. Kellogg Journal of Organization Behaviour, 1--41.
Kuruzovich, J. (2012). Time and Online Auctions. Journal of Electronic Commerce
Research, 13(1).
Liberman, N., Idson, L. C., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Predicting the intensity of losses
vs. non-gains and non-losses vs. gains in judging fairness and value: A test of
the loss aversion explanation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
527-534.
Marston, S., Li, Z, Bandyopadhyay, S, Zhang, J, & Ghalsasi, A. (2011). Cloud
computing—The business perspective. Decision Support Systems , 176--189.
McGraw, A. P., Larsen, J. T., Kahneman, D., & Schkade, D. (2010). Comparing gains
and losses. Psychological science, 21(10), 1438-1445.

Online Bidding Behaviour and Loss Aversion in Cloud Computing Markets:
An Experiment

Mihailescu, M., & Teo, Y. (2010). Dynamic resource pricing on federated Clouds.
Proceedings of 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud
and Grid Computing (CCGrid), (pp. 513--517).
Milkman, K. L., Mazza, M. C., Shu, L. L., Tsay, C.-J., & Bazerman, M. H. (2012).
Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: A method for improving legislative
outcomes. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 117(1),
158-167.
Regev, O., & Nisan, N. (2000). The POPCORN market. Online markets for
computational resources. Decision Support Systems, 28(1), 177--189.
Reinartz, W. (2001). Customising prices in online markets. European Business Forum
, 35--41.
Sayman, S., & Öncüler., A. (2005). Effects of study design characteristics on the
WTA–WTP disparity: A meta analytical framework. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 2, 289-312.
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehaviour. WW. Norton & Co. New
York.
Shneidman, J., & Parkes, D. (2003). Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer
networks. Peer-to-Peer Systems II, 139--148.
Sowmya, K., & Sundarraj, R. (2013). Generalized Second Price Auction for
Relatively Ranked Heterogeneous Spot Instances in the Cloud. Fifth
International Conference on Advanced Computing, Mangalore, IEEE.
Sowmya, K., Krishnaswamy, V., & Sundarraj, R. P. (2013). Decisions, Models and
Opportunities in Cloud Computing Economics: An assessment of Research on
Pricing and Markets. Third Australasian Symposium on Service Research and
Innovation. Sydney.
Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect:
Mechanisms of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73(3), 437.
Su, X. (2009). A model of consumer inertia with applications to dynamic pricing.
Production and Operations Management, 18(4), 365—380.
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing science, 4(3),
199-214.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice - a referencedependent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
Wee, S. (2011). Debunking Real-Time Pricing in Cloud Computing. Proceedings of
11th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid
Computing (CCGrid), (pp. 585 -590).
Weinhardt, C., Anandasivam, A., Blau, B., & J. Stößer. (2009). Business models in
the service world. IEEE IT Professional, Special Issue on Cloud Computing,
11(2), 28–33.
Weinman, J. (2011). The future of Cloud Computing. Proceedings of IEEE
Technology Time Machine Symposium on Technologies Beyond 2020
(TTM), (pp. 1--2).

